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Abstract 
In this paper we describe lessons learned from the creation of Basic Stand Alone (BSA) Public 
Use Files (PUFs) for the Comparative Effectiveness Research Public Use Files Data Pilot Project 
(CER-PUF). CER-PUF is aimed at increasing access to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) Medicare claims datasets through PUFs that: do not require user fees and data 
use agreements, have been de-identified to assure the confidentiality of the beneficiaries and 
providers, and still provide substantial analytic utility to researchers. For this paper we define 
PUFs as datasets characterized by free and unrestricted access to any user. We derive lessons 
learned from five major project activities: (i)  a review of the statistical and computer science 
literature on best practices in PUF creation, (ii) interviews with comparative effectiveness 
researchers to assess their data needs, (iii) case studies of PUF initiatives in the United States, (iv) 
interviews with stakeholders to identify the most salient issues regarding making microdata 
publicly available, and (v) the actual process of creating the Medicare claims data BSA PUFs. 
 
Keywords: Public use files, PUFs, re-identification, de-identification, Medicare claims, 
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1. Introduction & Background 
As administrator of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, CMS accumulates and maintains 
claims data on all fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries for different settings categorized into 8 
types of claims: Inpatient, Outpatient, Skilled Nursing Facilities, Home Health Agencies, 
Hospice, Physician/Supplier, Durable Medical Equipment, and Prescription Drug (Part D) 
Events.1 The importance of these data for comparative effectiveness research (CER) can hardly 
be overstated. Currently, however, researchers must not only prepare, submit, and gain approval 
of applications for data-use agreements (DUAs), but also pay a recovery-of-cost fee to get access 
to such files. In addition, researchers must be vigilant in observing legal restrictions on the use, 
maintenance, sharing, and final disposition of the files to which they gain access. For many 
researchers, the application and approval process, fees, and restrictions represent significant 
barriers to all kinds of healthcare related research.  
As host of these valuable data, CMS understands the importance of providing improved access to 
them. To further this objective, as part of the Comparative Effectiveness Research Public Use 
Data Pilot Project (CER-PUF), CMS recently initiated an effort to increase access to Medicare 
claims data through the creation and dissemination of public use files (PUFs) for researchers and 
data entrepreneurs. In this context we define PUFs as datasets characterized by free and 
unrestricted access to any user.  
                                                          
1 https://www.cms.gov/FilesForOrderGenInfo 
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The CER-PUF project is unique in that, while CMS currently provides aggregated data or tables 
with Medicare claims information, it has never before released micro-level (claim-level or 
beneficiary-level) data. Of paramount importance to the project is strict protection of beneficiary 
and provider confidentiality, in pursuit of which PUFs must comply with existing privacy laws, 
such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the Patient 
Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA). The HIPAA Privacy Rule protects the 
privacy of individually identifiable health information and also defines how protected health 
information can be disclosed and used. The PSQIA Patient Safety Rule establishes a framework 
by which hospitals, doctors, and other healthcare providers may voluntarily report information to 
Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs), on a privileged and confidential basis, for the aggregation 
and analysis of patient safety events.2  
The CER-PUF project is aimed at increasing access to CMS data sets through the creation of 
PUFs that (i) do not require user fees and data use agreements, (ii) have been de-identified and 
tested thoroughly to assure the confidentiality of the beneficiaries and providers is protected, and 
(iii) still contain significant analytic utility for end-users. To inform our PUF development 
process, we undertook a series of information-gathering activities. We also created Basic Stand 
Alone (BSA) PUFs for each of the 8 claims types listed above.  
 
This paper is organized into lessons learned from the five major CER-PUF activities to date: a 
statistical and computer sciences literature review on best practices in PUF creation (Section 2), 
interviews with comparative effectiveness researchers to assess their data needs (Section 3), case 
studies of PUF initiatives in the United States (Section 4), interviews with stakeholders to identify 
the most salient issues regarding making microdata publicly available (Section 5), and the actual 
process of creating the Medicare claims data BSA PUFs (Section 6). Section 7 concludes the 
paper with an overall assessment of lessons learned. The project also included a review of the 
laws and regulations governing creation of PUFs based on Medicare claims data, which is not 
included in our discussion. For details on that part of the project see Thorpe (2011). 
 
2. The Literature Review 
The primary question we addressed in the statistical and computer science literature review was 
the following: Is there a consensus regarding best practices for creating PUFs?  We summarize 
our main findings here; for detail we refer the reader to Prada et al. (2011). Although we found a 
great deal of information about possible methods, we found no consensus on any of the 
fundamental questions we sought to answer. 
2.1. Is there a shared framework for analyzing disclosure risk in the literature? 
Disclosure is the communication, either directly or by inference, of information about a member 
of a dataset that could not be known without viewing the dataset. Disclosure takes place if 
someone extracts information about any person (or other entity) from the dataset.  The literature 
calls this individual the intruder. Duncan et al. (1993) distinguish three types of disclosure: (i) 
when a data subject is identified from a released file (identity disclosure); (ii) when sensitive 
information about a data subject is revealed through the released file (attribute disclosure); (iii) 
when the released data make it possible to determine the value of some characteristic of an 
individual more accurately than otherwise would have been possible (inferential disclosure). 
                                                          
2 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services; http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/index.html  
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Hundepool et al. (2010) argues that a general framework for addressing disclosure risk should 
address the following questions in a cohesive and consistent way:  
 Why is confidential protection needed?  
 What are the key characteristics and uses of the data?  
 What disclosure risks need to be protected against?  
 What disclosure methods are the most efficient? 
 How much utility is lost?  
 What is the risk of re-identification? 
We searched the literature for answers to these questions within a single cohesive framework, but 
found instead two competing research paradigms. 
Paradigm 1 holds that it is indeed possible to minimize the risk of disclosure and therefore to 
release data to the public. This paradigm comes from the statistical literature on disclosure 
limitation techniques and their achievements, which is extensive (see Prada et al. 2011 and 
Duncan et al. 2011 for recent reviews). Consistent with Paradigm 1, this literature is devoted to 
developing methods and software to mask data. Multiple methods are available, from simple (i.e., 
coarsening) to complex (i.e., synthetic) methods. Paradigm 2, in contrast, holds that privacy and 
confidentiality cannot be achieved in an environment in which personal information is gathered at 
an increasing rate by multiple people with multiple interests. This sharply contrasting paradigm 
comes from the computer science literature. For instance, computer scientists Narayanan and 
Shmatikov (2010) criticize the types of de-identification techniques developed by Paradigm 1 
advocates as based on the assumption that personally identifiable information is a fixed set of 
attributes such as names and contact information, which “creates the fallacious distinction 
between „identifying‟ and „non-identifying‟ attributes.” Such a distinction might make sense in 
the context of one attack, these authors say, but is increasingly meaningless as the amount and 
variety of publicly available information about individuals grows exponentially. In a similar vein, 
Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor argue that the type of privacy defined by Dalenius (1977), on 
which the statistical literature is based (“access to a statistical database should not enable one to 
learn anything about an individual that could not be learned without access”) cannot be achieved 
as a general rule. These authors illustrate the intuition for their finding with the following parable:  
“Suppose one’s exact height were considered a sensitive piece of information, and that revealing 
the exact height of an individual were a privacy breach. Assume that the database yields the 
average heights of women of different nationalities. An adversary who has access to the 
statistical database and the auxiliary information “Terry Gross is two inches shorter than the 
average Lithuanian woman” learns Terry Gross’ height, while anyone learning only the auxiliary 
information, without access to the average heights, learns relatively little.” (Dwork and Naor, 
2010, p. 93) 
2.2. Are there standards for acceptable risk? 
According to Paradigm 1, data should be released if the probability of identifying an individual or 
entity in the data file is sufficiently small. However, there are as yet no definitive answers for 
practitioners regarding either a specific definition of universal risk, assumptions about the 
intruder, or what constitutes “sufficiently small”. The definition of what is “sufficiently small” is 
currently up to the data producer, based on the producer‟s obligation to the subjects in the dataset.  
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In the case of healthcare data, HIPAA provides a list of eighteen (18) direct identifiers, 
collectively known as the Safe-Harbor Method, that must be removed to comply with the HIPAA 
regulations.3 This approach, which is intuitive, could lead one to naively think the dataset is then 
safe from disclosure because no individual is explicitly identifiable.  However, as shown by 
Sweeney (1997, 2000) and Agrawal and Srikant (2000), removal of direct identifiers does not 
protect all individuals from data disclosure or re-identification. A combination of just a few 
indirect identifiers (such as birth date, gender, and zip code) can be used to identify a large 
portion of individuals on any dataset. And these variables can then be matched to another publicly 
available dataset to identify individuals in the data. This is another area without definitive 
answers for a practitioner. 
2.3. Which are the most frequently applied techniques for limiting disclosure risk? 
Limiting disclosure risk can be done in two steps.4 First, significant protection can be attained 
simply by using a random sample data as the source file for the PUF, rather than the full (or 
population) data base. Second, after selection of the source file, additional protection is possible 
by applying policy rules if any (e.g., HIPAA‟s Safe-Harbor Rule) and/or disclosure limitation 
techniques. The latter is known as “treating” the data. We provide a brief summary of the most 
frequently applied techniques. For a technical description of the limitations of each see Winkler 
(2007). 
2.3.1. Sampling, Global Recoding, and Local Suppression 
Sampling from a full database is a powerful method of protecting the confidentiality of data by 
creating uncertainty about whether the target record exists in the PUF. It is also important to 
control for that probability, however, by determining the appropriate sample size. Even though 
this decision is based on the size of the full database, number of variables included in it, and other 
characteristics of the included variables, a sample size of 1%-5% is widely accepted and used for 
PUFs in the U.S.5 For example, the U.S. Social Security Administration provides a 1% sample for 
the 2004 Benefits and Earnings PUF, 2006 Earnings PUF, 2001 Old-Age, Survivors PUF, and 
Disability Insurance (OASDI) PUF, and a 5% sample for the 2001 Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) PUF. The U.S. Census Bureau has been providing both a 1% and a 5% PUF from the 2000 
Census of Population and Housing.  
When determining appropriate sample size, data producers inevitably have to compromise 
between the utility of the PUF and the risk of re-identification. As the sample size is increased, 
the precision of the statistical estimates improves. However, this also increases the risk of re-
identification by diminishing uncertainty about whether the target is actually in the sample. No 
agreed-upon method yet exists on the optimal way to make this compromise. 
Global recoding is a process of reducing the number of values a single variable can have in a 
dataset.  For example, if an individual‟s birth date exists in a dataset it can be used as an indirect 
identifying variable.  However, recoding the variable to coarser values, such as birth year, will 
make it less useful as an indirect identifier. Recoding to even coarser values, such as five-year 
intervals, will further reduce the identifying power of the information. The appropriate level of 
                                                          
3 For the list of direct identifiers see: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/m2e411a1.htm#box2 
4 For a summary of general guidelines see the “Statistical Policy Working Paper 22 (2nd version, 2005)”, 
Report on Statistical Disclosure Limitation Methodology, Office of Management and Budget, 2005. 
5 Using a sample also requires (i) ensuring that the estimates obtained from the sample accurately represent 
the population and (ii) including sample weights. 
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recoding also depends on the trade-off chosen between the competing needs for data 
confidentiality and preservation of data utility. 
Local suppression is the process of removing, or suppressing, data from a dataset.  This can be 
done for single variables within a record or for an entire record. The current local suppression 
rule relies on creating a file without small cells, so that no record is unique to one group of 
variables. This rule, currently known as k-anonymity, has been in use by statisticians for decades 
(Willenborg and de Waal, 1996).  Under this rule, indirect identifying variables are recoded until 
each combination of recoded variables has at least k number of records associated with it.  At this 
point no individual in the dataset can be identified with certainty because no individual has a 
unique profile.  
2.3.2. Perturbation  
Perturbation is a process that reduces disclosure risk by altering the values of variables in the 
dataset.  Perturbation can take multiple forms, including selective perturbation, data swapping, 
substitution, and synthetic treatments. Selective perturbation deterministically selects records for 
treatment to reduce disclosure risk. Also called blank and impute, the method selects values from 
single records, removes them from the record, then imputes a new value (Skinner, 2009). Data 
swapping transforms a dataset by exchanging values of sensitive information between records 
(Fienberg and McIntyre, 2005). Substitution replaces some or all identifying variables in a record 
with the same variables from another record; it is different from data swapping in that the data 
only move in one direction (Singh, 2009). Synthetic treatment, a technique that is gaining ground, 
treats all records in the dataset to create a new, “synthetic” dataset that is representative of the 
original data file. The indirect identifying variables may be changed by a variety of methods, 
including perturbation, multiple imputations, and other model-based techniques (Reiter, 2009).   
2.4. Is there consensus on how to measure utility loss? 
Selecting the variables to be treated depends on the content of the source data, preferences of the 
data producer, and availability of external data sources with similar information. But every time a 
variable is treated its utility decreases. There are algorithms whose purpose is to make the process 
of recoding as efficient as possible by minimizing the amount of information loss while reducing 
disclosure risk. These algorithms use information loss metrics, which quantify the precision lost 
in the data from recoding to compare possible recoding and suppression schema and generally 
navigate through a decision tree comprising all possible recoding/suppression options (see El 
Emam et al., 2009 for detailed discussion of some of them). Information loss metrics are only 
useful in making decisions regarding recoding and suppression; they provide no measure of data 
utility. One way to get such information is by conducting a needs assessment, the topic of the 
next section.  
3. The Needs Assessment  
The needs assessment part of the CER-PUF study asked comparative researchers what they 
needed in PUFs from the Medicare claims database. This section summarizes our findings. For 
detail see Erdem and Concannon (2011). 
3.1. Objective 
The purpose of this part of the study was to understand the research needs of comparative 
effectiveness analysts in PUFs developed from Medicare claims data files. We did this through 
interviews with researchers selected from academia, government agencies, private companies, 
and non-profit organizations. The interviews were based on a discussion guide developed 
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specifically for the project. The criterion for interviewee selection was that they had experience 
with Medicare claims data, were expert in CER, or both. After a screening process, 15 researchers 
were interviewed.  
3.2. Findings 
Overall, the researchers praised the availability of PUFs as an appropriate and useful 
development. The researchers believed that PUFs can be very helpful in health services or health 
policy research provided they contain a sufficient range of variables. However, the BSA PUFs we 
created in the first year of the project were viewed as insufficient to satisfy the complex needs of 
comparative effectiveness research. It was generally agreed that access to the actual claims data 
would still be necessary.  
3.2.1. Current process for gaining data access 
According to the current CMS data licensing system, researchers have to submit their research 
plans and request the necessary data. If approved, they have to sign a DUA with CMS, pay a non-
negligible fee, and agree to significant restrictions on maintenance, sharing, and re-using the data. 
Not surprisingly, our interviews revealed strong agreement that the current process is both 
expensive and long. This combination is damaging, according to our interviewees, because it 
inhibits health researchers from independently pursuing research topics that are not funded as part 
of some large overall contract or grant. There was also agreement that lower costs could increase 
the quantity of research done on important health topics. Interestingly, even though interviewees 
complained about the lengthy and restricting approval process, many emphasized the importance 
of privacy concerns and the necessity of having a strict DUA.  
3.2.2. Potential of PUFs for Research 
Researchers were enthusiastic about the availability of micro level PUFs in general. Our 
interviewees agreed that Medicare claims PUFs would significantly increase exposure to 
Medicare claims files--allowing users to create descriptive statistics, analyze basic relationships, 
formulate hypotheses, answer high-level questions, and perform preliminary analyses for research 
projects. It was also widely agreed that PUFs could provide an opportunity for researchers to 
conduct preliminary analyses for pilot studies prior to spending considerable time and money 
obtaining a DUA. There was consensus, however, that without more variables than in our 
project‟s BSA PUFs, such as detailed diagnosis and procedures, PUFs alone would not be 
sufficient for most CER studies. Since obvious challenges are involved in creating PUFs with 
high analytic utility for CER while maintaining confidentially, most researchers agreed on the 
importance of establishing appropriate expectations of what the PUFs involve and how they can 
best be used. It was also emphasized that even enriched PUFs will not be enough, and that 
researchers will still need a method by which they can have access to Medicare identifiable files 
or limited data sets. 
Interviewees emphasized that most CER requires multi-year datasets in which beneficiaries can 
be tracked over time and across different types of care.6 Hence, stand-alone PUFs created with 
data from a single year and including only one type of care (e.g., Inpatient) for a specific calendar 
year would probably not be very helpful. Researchers also agreed that a PUF that is linkable to 
other PUFs as well as to external data sets would have much higher utility. 
                                                          
6 Ideally, these should allow for chronological sequencing of treatments and hospitalizations for each 
beneficiary. 
Section on Government Statistics – JSM 2011
4100
  
Other information interviewees expressed interest in accessing include: 
 Providers, such as an encrypted ID, characteristics of provider and/or healthcare setting (e.g., 
primary care physician or specialist, size of institution), 
 Geography, such as state of residence, zip code, hospital referral region (HRR), or urban/rural 
designation, 
 Race/ethnicity of beneficiaries, 
 Supplementary insurance, such as dual eligibility (i.e., Medicaid) or other insurance,  
 Health outcomes, such as mortality, morbidity, survival, discharge/transfer, re-admission, and 
major clinical events. 
All interviewees emphasized the importance of a comprehensive codebook and sufficient 
documentation.  There was also some feedback favoring (1) a simple user interface that allows for 
basic statistical analyses and tables with the PUFs, and/or (2) a responsive technical assistance 
and support team that would allow users to ask questions. 
Finally, several interviewees were concerned that PUFs could inadvertently increase the number 
of studies with incorrect assumptions and, therefore, misleading results. This led to the suggestion 
that a framework for training researchers on correct data use be considered. It was widely agreed, 
however, that the alternative of not expanding public access to Medicare data would be worse 
than the risks of triggering improper research.  
3.2.3. De-identification methods 
Given the various methods of de-identification listed above in subsection 2.3, most interviewees 
favored suppression as the only acceptable approach, on the grounds that suppression would 
remove outlier observations from the data while leaving all other records unaltered. Some of the 
researchers feared that the high level of de-identification needed for PUFs based on Medicare 
claims data would decrease the analytic utility of any PUF significantly. 
One suggestion offered for dealing with researcher concerns over working with perturbed data 
was to offer the service of re-run completed SAS, SPSS, STATA or other programs on 
unperturbed data,7 which would allow data users to validate their PUF-based research results. 
This suggestion was made particularly in the context of addressing peer reviewed journal 
concerns about publishing results based on perturbed data. 
Although all discussion partners viewed lack of a DUA for PUFs as favorable, those with 
experience creating PUFs suggested that CMS have a registration process, ask for a minimum set 
of information from the user (e.g., name, address, phone number, organization), and require a 
commitment to comply with a short list of rules. 
One researcher raised the risks of including any geographic identifiers, given the potential for re-
identification through the “mosaic effects” of multiple files overlaid on each other, or through 
data “mash-ups” from multiple files and multiple sources. Such risks are eliminated within the 
BSA PUFs, which were created from disjoint samples of Medicare beneficiaries. 
  
                                                          
7 This could be accomplished by a data enclave or a remote data center.  
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4. Case Studies of other PUF Initiatives 
To elicit lessons learned from other PUF data initiatives, we undertook six case studies of 
individual-level data initiatives in the US. 
4.1. Objective 
The objective of the case studies undertaken for the CER-PUF project was to provide CMS with 
instructive information for use in its CER-PUF initiative.  For this purpose, we chose from a 
number of projects identified as representative of the wide variety of existing PUF initiatives, de-
identification methodologies, and data access methods. We ensured inclusion of a range of 
initiative types, by choosing case studies based on the following project characteristics: domain, 
sponsoring entity type, project organization, de-identification methods, data access restrictions, 
and data access methods. For detail on the selected initiatives, choice of data access methods, and 
initiative-specific features see Prada, S. 2011.  
4.2. Findings  
Four of the six case studies are PUFs and two are Non-Public Use Files (non-PUF), defined as 
files characterized by access restrictions that oblige users to reveal their identity and intentions for 
use. Typically, non-PUFs demand signed DUAs before granting data access. 
4.2.1. Disclosure risk standard  
Among the four case study institutions that provide PUFs by our definition (i.e., with no 
restrictions), we found that the Confidentiality and Data Access Committee‟s (CDAC) Checklist 
on Disclosure Potential of Proposed Data Releases is widely used as the tool to assess disclosure 
risk of proposed data. We found, in contrast, that the CDAC Checklist is not used by the two non-
PUF initiatives. One described its decision-to-release process as a “judgment call” based on its 
knowledge of both the data and the data users; the other simply relies on the individual risk 
analysis made at the original data source. 
None of the six initiatives uses a theoretically established risk framework. Nor did we find any 
formal definition of a “safe threshold” (beyond the HIPAA “Safe Harbor” method) to judge 
whether a candidate file will be considered ready for release. By “safe threshold” we mean a 
specified percentage of records at risk of re-identification within the file above which a file would 
not be considered ready for public release. In all six interviewed institutions, such decisions are 
made on a case by case basis. 
4.2.2. Disclosure Review Board or similar panel 
All four of the case study initiatives that release PUFs have followed the recommendations in 
Statistical Policy Working Paper 22 and centralized their review of disclosure-limited data 
products by establishing a DRB or similar panel. A common practice is for a completed CDAC 
Checklist memo to be submitted to the organization‟s DRB or similar panel for review. 
Interestingly, DRBs are nonexistent for the non-PUF initiatives in the case study. None of the 
documents reviewed by DRBs or any of the DRB decisions made are available to researchers; 
and no information on data disclosure avoidance steps taken is released by non-PUF institutions. 
Interestingly, in the one case where the PUF includes information from two different agencies, 
the DRBs of both are required to approve release of the file. 
4.2.3. Geographic information  
Detailed geographic indicators are generally stripped from the PUFs included in our case studies.  
This practice follows CDAC‟s Checklist suggestions, as geography is a key factor in enabling 
Section on Government Statistics – JSM 2011
4102
  
identification. Geographic indicators are not stripped from the two non-PUF case study 
initiatives, however. In one of the two cases (the Surveillance, Epidemiology and End Results 
(SEER) Program of the National Cancer Institute) state and county identifiers are available, and 
there are no minimum population requirements. In the other case (the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality), some states release zip 
codes at the 3- and some even at the 5-digit level. 
4.2.4. Weights 
PUFs whose data are collected through surveys only release final weights. They do not release the 
components that make up the final weight because these may be indicative of geographic areas.  
They usually do not release the actual PSU and strata identifiers either, because that can be risky 
as well. Instead, they provide pseudo-strata and pseudo-PSU variables containing less 
information than the replicates. Replicate and/or bootstrap weights are provided for variance 
estimation. In the case of the Census, each PUF file contains a weighting factor for each 
population and housing unit record to enable full population estimates. These weights are not 
adjusted after disclosure limitation methods are applied, however. 
4.2.5. Professional expertise required 
We found that the level of expertise these institutions use to create both PUFs and non-PUFs is 
high, interdisciplinary, and considered a scarce resource. Several senior statisticians and 
mathematicians are involved in the typical PUF creation process. Additional experts are also 
involved, including (i) DRB members and other senior staff who review the files before release, 
(ii) data analysis experts such as economists and epidemiologists (depending on the data 
collected), and (iii) expert statisticians at the firms contracted to create the actual PUFs. One of 
the case studies revealed that there is a scarcity of professionals with background in de-
identification methods, an unexpected finding that seems rooted in lack of interest in the topic at 
U.S. graduate schools.  
4.2.6. Identifying risk  
The main criterion used by our case study institutions to identify potentially identifiable records 
in PUF initiatives, shared by both PUF and non-PUF initiatives, is whether a record is unique 
with respect to a combination of key variables (known as k-anonymity). Typically, demographic 
indicators such as gender, age, race, education, marital status, number of children, geographical 
location, are used to define combinations. Which variables and the exact nature of the 
combination(s) is confidential information.  
4.2.7. Disclosure limitation methods and software 
We found no preference among the many methods available for limiting data. The agencies 
included in our case studies use all the well-known technique (coarsening, suppression, top and 
bottom coding, rounding, random rounding, and data swapping). The decision on which method 
to use is typically case-specific and even variable-specific. It also depends on internal 
deliberation. Each initiative has its own algorithm for disclosure avoidance. And all refrain from 
using disclosure avoidance software because of the possibility of reverse engineering. As 
expected, PUF initiatives use more sophisticated masking techniques than non-PUF initiatives. 
4.2.8. Risk of match to other datasets  
We also found that agencies take into consideration other files available to the public (e.g., 
online) when evaluating the risk of disclosure. This is true for both external datasets and 
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previously released data (e.g. reports, tables) from the same source. These comparative activities 
are conducted both in-house and/or by outside contractors (particularly data security firms). The 
degree and level of sophistication of these activities vary by initiative, with Census, NCHS, and 
NCES exemplifying initiatives that are highly concerned and highly cautious, and non-PUF 
initiatives such as those in our case studies much less so.     
4.2.9. Re-identification certification 
None of the cases studied has a re-identification certification procedure in place. Re-identification 
refers to the possibility of an intruder being able to identify someone in a PUF and learn 
information that he/she would not be able to learn otherwise. Re-identification certification tests 
the vulnerability of PUFs to external sources and need to be conducted by a third party.    
4.2.10. Data utility  
We found little information on what is done regarding data utility (e.g., an assessment of 
information loss) after applying statistical disclosure limitation (SDL) methods. While the PUF 
initiatives in our case studies reported that they do conduct such analyses, these are not available 
to researchers. The data utility analyses we were told about concentrate on comparisons of means 
and distribution tests before and after disclosure treatment, to determine their effect on pre-
treatment statistical characteristics of the data.  In-house and consultant statisticians also do 
multivariate tests to study effects on relationships among multiple variables. Despite the limited 
nature of these tests, all PUF-initiative case studies highlighted the importance of data utility 
analyses, and, in particular, the coordination of such analyses between statisticians and program 
directors (topic experts), to avoid unnecessary distortions in the data to be released. These 
concerns were less pronounced for the non-PUF initiatives. 
4.2.11. Data access  
Access to data is granted via online query systems, PUFs, licenses, and onsite at Research Data 
Centers (see section 7.3 for further detail). We found no access method to be preferred over 
another. Our case study institutions have adopted such methods in response to user demands. The 
degree to which access to detailed information is allowed (of the type that is not available in 
PUFs) depends on both the pertinence of the research question and the degree by which an 
individual (or individuals) can be held accountable for the use of the data. None of our case study 
institutions had plans to stop releasing data to the public.   
4.2.12. Confidentiality requirements to users  
We found that the degree to which PUF initiatives warn users-to-be on confidentiality issues 
(such as to explicitly avoid actions aimed at re-identifying individuals) varies greatly, from short 
statements on the webpage where the data are located to agreeing to online DUAs before 
download. The two non-PUF initiatives required users to sign and submit DUAs for agency 
revision and approval before granting data access. 
4.2.13. Documentation 
All initiatives investigated were similar in stressing documentation as a key success factor. 
Descriptions of data fields are provided in data dictionaries. Descriptions cover the content of 
each field, method of presentation, and disclosure avoidance steps taken to provide 
confidentiality. However, PUF initiatives are cautious of not revealing unnecessary information, 
making the language used rather generic. Our review of the documentation available online for all 
the case study initiatives suggested that what has been done to protect the data is not discussed at 
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length nor easy to find in documentation. It is our understanding that the SDL techniques should 
not be revealed unless the data producer is certain that such information does not increase the re-
identification risk by allowing re-engineering of the actual data. 
4.2.14. Communication channels and user feedback  
There are three main channels of two-way communication between each of the case study 
initiatives and its users: email, phone numbers, and personal communication at national 
conferences. Regarding diffusion of data releases, the main channels are via listserv and 
notifications on their respective websites. As for user feedback, we found that data are not 
generally modified in response to user demands, as these typically involve requests for more 
detailed information. However, when errors are discovered, either by staff or by users, corrections 
are made and the PUFs are re-released. Social media channels such as Facebook and Twitter were 
not in use at the time of our case studies. However, our review of websites suggests that these 
agencies are moving rapidly in that direction. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), the US Census Bureau and the Social Security Administration, for example, can all be 
followed on Facebook and Twitter.  
4.2.15. Strong success record  
Despite the variety of approaches to guarantee privacy and confidentiality (methods and access) 
among our case studies, we found a strong overall record of success. Perhaps the only problem 
cited, by non-PUF institutions, is that occasionally researchers publish papers with a small-count 
cell in a table (e.g., less than 10 individuals, less than 3 institutions). In those cases researchers 
are asked to immediately take the necessary steps to remove or retrieve such information from 
where it has been published. There has been no reported breach of confidentiality to date in any 
of the cases studied.    
5. Stakeholder Interviews 
In this section, we provide a summary of the stakeholder interviews conducted as part of the 
CER-PUF project. 
5.1. Objective 
The issues regarding de-identification of data for PUF creation are complex, with the interest of 
many parties involved. In the stakeholder interviews we met with three types of experts: experts 
on de-identification, health information privacy experts or advocates, and governmental 
representatives from organizations that provide PUFs. The goal was to identify the most salient 
issues regarding making microdata publicly available.  
5.2. Findings  
The principal concern identified by our stakeholder experts was that no legal enforcement 
mechanisms exist to hold individuals accountable for attempting to re-identify data that has been 
de-identified, since once data have been de-identified they fall outside the boundaries of relevant 
Federal legislation, such as Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the 
Privacy Act. Stakeholders also expressed the belief that de-identification methods traditionally 
used by many government agencies to create public use datasets – such as the HIPAA safe harbor 
method – may no longer provide adequate protection against skilled data intruders, due to 
advances in re-identification methods.  They emphasized that agencies need to keep informed of 
the constantly changing landscape of de- and re-identification methods, to ensure they apply 
effective treatments and/or access restrictions to safeguard the data they release.  
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The stakeholders interviewed also explained that agencies intending to release PUFs must 
contend with a constantly shifting environment, in which an ever-increasing amount of publicly 
and privately held data about individuals is becoming ever more easily accessible. Improvements 
in data mining technology and the science of data re-identification magnify the concern that 
external data sources can be linked to PUFs and used to re-identify the individuals in them.  
These experts noted that there are no uniformly accepted data de-identification methods, and that 
the choices of particular de-identification techniques used by government agencies are primarily 
based on the specific details of the data being treated. The consensus among our experts was that 
there are no generally agreed-upon standards for an acceptable level of disclosure risk, or even for 
methods to objectively quantify such risk. Ultimately, decisions about levels of risk need to be 
made by each agency, based on what it considers sound policy.  
Last, according to stakeholders the trade-off between ease of data access and analytic utility noted 
earlier is inherent.  The data access method chosen by an agency for a particular dataset is 
dependent on the level of detail about individuals in the dataset.  Typically, the more useful a 
dataset is to researchers, the more detail it contains that can be used to identify the individuals 
within it, and, thus, the more restrictive must be the access methods provided for it.  For this 
reason, the stakeholders recommended a tiered system of access, based on the level of detail in a 
dataset, rather than focusing on the PUF option only. A tiered access system, in which more 
detailed data are provided to data recipients conditional on additional restrictions and obligations, 
can help balance this trade-off.  
Overall, stakeholders agreed that creating de-identified individual-level Medicare claims public 
use data files, while providing significant analytic utility, is an extremely challenging endeavor. 
They expressed the belief that data can never be completely de-identified with certainty, and that 
it is prudent, therefore, to apply additional measures of protection, such as DUAs, to help mitigate 
disclosure risk and dissuade would-be intruders from attempting to re-identify data. 
6. Creating the BSA PUFs   
In the first phase of the CER-PUF project, 8 BSA PUFs have been produced; one per type of 
claim (e.g., inpatient, carrier). Because priority was given to protecting the privacy of Medicare 
beneficiaries, the amount of information released was limited. Each BSA PUF contains 7 to 10 
analytic variables, the selection of which was based on recommendations received from 
researchers (see section 4). Even with this limited number, some of these PUFs contain millions 
of records. (The carrier BSA PUF has close to 68 million line items, for example, and the Part D 
Events BSA PUF more than 50 million events).   
Among the set of SDL methods available in the literature, we chose non-perturbative methods, 
such as rounding and coarsening, and local suppression, following the preferences of the 
researchers. Examples of variables that were coarsened include: age into 5-year intervals, 5-digit 
ICD-9 codes into 3-digit ICD-9 codes, and number of visits and days into categories. Rounding 
was applied to monetary values, such as Medicare payment amounts, with different rounding 
rules depending on the range of values. We found the best substitute for a risk measure in the 
CMS‟ DUA for use of CMS data in the creation of any document, which stipulates that “… no 
cell (e.g., admittances, discharges, patients, services) 10 or less may be displayed. Also, no use of 
percentages or other mathematical formulas may be used if they result in the display of a cell 10 
or less.” Hence, every cell (i.e., unique combination of all variables) in the BSA PUFs contains at 
least 11 beneficiaries in the population with the same claim information; smaller cells are 
Section on Government Statistics – JSM 2011
4106
  
suppressed (after rounding and coarsening steps). With a 5% random sample and the “rule of 11”, 
the maximum risk for any given cell is 0.0045 (i.e., 0.05*(1/11)), which corresponds to the 
probability of an intruder claiming that he/she found his/her target for a randomly drawn record 
from any of the BSA PUFs. As 11 is the smallest cell size in the file, the risk of the whole PUF 
may be significantly smaller than 0.0045, depending on the distribution of records across cells.           
To avoid utility loss (though without a metric) we searched iteratively for the optimal number of 
variables and coarsening/rounding decisions to keep the suppression rate (i.e., number of records 
suppressed divided by the total number of records in initial 5% sample) under 10%. Also, we 
compared the frequency distributions of variable values before and after the suppression to ensure 
that the PUFs provided information consistent with the actual claims files. 
7. Conclusions Regarding Data Access Options 
Many government agencies and institutions host data collected through surveys or administrative 
records (in the case of Medicare, for example, actual claims). Researchers need access to these 
data to analyze important policy issues. Given the need to protect the privacy of the individuals in 
the data sets, however, access to the files can only be made possible by either restricting access 
through stringent DUAs, removing information that might lead to the identification of individuals 
and issuing PUFs, or giving researchers access, not through their own computers but through 
secure portals of some type. We review the advantages and disadvantage of each briefly below. 
7.1. The DUA approach   
The great benefit of abiding by restrictive DUA terms is researcher access to either the actual or 
minimally altered data sets. In most such cases, researchers can even have personal copies of the 
data on their computers. But the financial costs of accessing these datasets can be high, restricting 
de facto access by researchers without the requisite funds. A possibly more important detriment is 
that the datasets can be shared, which can lead inadvertently to a breach of confidentiality, or 
stolen, when the breach is deliberate. A breach of unsecured health information can harm an 
individual in multiple ways, but it can also be disastrous for the agency involved. In the U.S. 
healthcare system, any breach has to be reported to the Department of Health and Human 
Services and to the affected individuals because of the Breach Notification Rule of HIPAA.8 By 
then, of course, the damage will have been done. 
7.2. The PUF approach 
The benefit of PUFs is that they are typically available for free download on the data host‟s 
website. This gives researchers full and unrestricted access to the PUF and the ability to perform 
analyses at will without incurring access costs or having to submit a research plan. However, as 
detailed in this paper, PUFs have the non-negligible disadvantage of diminished data utility. 
The CER-PUF project provided the opportunity to fully assess the costs and benefits of 
disseminating CMS claims datasets as PUFs. The lessons we learned can be summarized in the 
follow advice to PUF developers: 
 Review underlying laws and regulations regarding the dataset and the institution that hosts it; 
 Review PUF plans with stakeholders to assess viability; 
 Identify SDL techniques that are acceptable to not only the de-identification and privacy 
experts but also the data end-users; 
                                                          
8 http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/index.html 
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 Understand the needs of end-users in terms of variables and how they are presented in the 
PUF; 
 Use samples (rather than the full database) to provide added protection; 
 Define a risk assessment method and a risk measure, by determining the most likely intruder 
scenario; 
 Define a utility loss metric to quantify the effect of de-identification on the information on the 
data file; 
 Do not make the SDL technique public if such information would reduce the safety of the 
PUF;  
 Prepare detailed documentation, codebook, data dictionary, and FAQs; 
 Invest in a range of dissemination methods to increase visibility and ease of use, such as 
preparing a dashboard, producing short briefs, designing challenges, and making conference 
presentations.  
7.3. Access through secure data portals 
If access to the actual database is deemed absolutely essential, Remote Data Centers (RDCs) or 
Data Enclaves are two very secure options. These options require significant investments in 
information technology infrastructure and maintenance, and may also need a mechanism output 
review. They are more secure than providing access via DUAs and data access fees, simply 
because data files are stored in safe locations (not on researchers‟ laptops or mobile data storage 
devices). In the RDC option, researchers must be physically at the RDC location in order to 
access the data. For example, the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) has two RDC 
locations (Hyattsville, MD and Atlanta, GA), where researchers can work under supervision 
during regular business hours. Users have to satisfy a list of requirements, such as submitting a 
proposal and seeking approval, following strict guidelines while on site, and providing their 
computer software codes (SAS, Sudaan, etc.) to the RDC staff. They also have the option to 
access NCHS data from locations that belong to the U.S. Census Bureau following additional 
requirements and security procedures. An RDC option may not be convenient to researchers, 
however, given the limited number of locations and the need to travel to where the database is.  
The Data Enclave option allows researchers to access the data remotely from any computer with a 
secure internet connection at any time. Users can submit their queries or procedures using 
statistical software and ask the automated system to send the results, the log file, or even an 
output file via email. The disadvantage in comparison to the RDC option is that research activity 
may be limited by the options in the available software programs or what the researcher can 
observe in terms of output. This is because of the automated nature of the remote access 
framework and lack of an in-person review mechanism and a controlled environment, as are 
present in an RDC. 
7.4. A Mixed Dissemination Strategy 
A dissemination strategy that involves some or all of the options above may be optimal. It is clear 
the PUFs can not only increase the availability of data without requiring DUAs or fees but also be 
sufficient for many studies. But it is also clear that certain research questions cannot be 
adequately addressed without all the details of the actual data, including individual identities or 
identifiers. Such questions can only be answered by making the actual files available, either by 
delivering the file to researchers or by placing them into RDCs or Data Enclaves. How all these 
options should be weighted in a mixed strategy depends importantly on the costs associated with 
each, which are not covered in this paper.  
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